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INTRODUCTION 
This article suggests a strategy for achieving smart growth land use 
rules through the adoption of programmatic1 and city-wide policy. 
Programmatic and city-wide policy proposals create more 
favorable dynamics to allow for smart growth policy outcomes, unlike 
more traditional approaches of updating neighborhood-level plans, or 
making land use decisions on a project-by-project basis.  Legal 
principles like forum shopping and concepts from social sciences about 
political economies and structuring decisions can inform strategy to 
implement land use policy and local land use law. 
This article uses examples from the City of San Diego and its 
experiences attempting to update its land use policies to focus toward 
smart growth.2  Using a programmatic and city-wide approach to land 
use reforms is also a strategy that should be considered for cities and 
regions nationwide. 
Political science has long understood that small, well-organized 
groups seeking concentrated policy gains can often prevail over larger 
groups seeking diffuse benefits for the general public.3  Legal academia 
has also recognized this dynamic and its role in land use policy.4  
                                                          
1. For this piece, “programmatic policies” are those that apply rules for 
development across a broad set of properties and neighborhoods that share certain 
characteristics.  To a large degree, “programmatic” in this article is akin to legislative 
actions.  For example, rules that apply to all multi-family developments, or that apply 
to all developments that include deed-restricted units would be programmatic because 
they would not be based on particular parcels or neighborhoods.  Certain 
programmatic rules could apply to all developments city-wide, and others could apply 
to a subset of a jurisdiction, such as for all developments that are near transit.   
2. For this piece, “smart growth” means more intense development of jobs and 
homes in locations that will facilitate more active transportation and use of public 
transit.  This kind of development is essential to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions, and to improve affordability.   
3. See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
4. David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L. REV. 1707–08 (2013).  This 
article largely agrees with Schleicher on how political economies impact land use 
2
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Opposition to smart growth decisions in the form of community plan 
updates, or individual project entitlements, can capture concentrated 
gains for opponents of change while shifting diffuse costs onto the 
general public.  This dynamic strengthens opposition to smart growth 
when decisions are made on a neighborhood or project level. 
Programmatic and city-wide policy decisions create a different 
dynamic that is more favorable to smart growth outcomes.  For large 
cities, smart growth policies that have a city-wide impact create diffuse 
public benefits, and any associated costs are also spread out.  When 
costs are not concentrated to any particular neighborhood, small 
opposition groups have less incentive and capacity to organize against 
policy changes.  Larger groups, with goals to achieve widely-dispersed 
public benefits, have sufficient motivation and incentive to dedicate 
political support for city-wide policy changes.  Approaching smart 
growth policy on a programmatic and city-wide basis creates more 
favorable dynamics for reforms to be politically viable. 
This article is intended to inform how local governments plan out 
their policy agendas, where they allocate staff resources, and how they 
spend political capital.  Planners and staff for mayors and city managers 
can also use the strategy in this article to present smart growth policy 
proposals to elected decision-makers that create more favorable 
dynamics for adoption.  Programmatic policy changes and city-wide 
land use code updates can be important tools, if policymakers 
understand their value and the opportunity they represent. 
I.  ACHIEVING SMART GROWTH OUTCOMES IS POLITICALLY DIFFICULT 
A.  Background on the City of San Diego 
Outdated development policies and housing shortages have become 
common in large American cities.5  Current San Diego land use policies 
uniquely undermine the goals of smart growth.  A recent study found 
that San Diego land use around transit was the least well utilized in 
                                                          
decision-making, but I argue for a different strategy for how to navigate those 
dynamics.  
5. See State of the Nation’s Housing, JOINT CENTER FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF 
HARVARD UNIV. (2015), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/ 
jchs-sonhr-2015-full.pdf.  
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California.6  A full forty percent of housing costs in San Diego are the 
result of regulatory choices, not merely the high demand for the 
region’s good weather and proximity to the ocean.7  The cost of housing 
to renters and buyers is often substantially higher than the cost of 
development in other American cities today.  San Diego is one of the 
few markets in the nation where this has been a problem since as early 
as the 1970s.8 
San Diego’s poor record of smart growth runs counter to some of 
the city’s stated goals.  The City of San Diego has adopted a variety of 
forward-looking plans intended to implement smart growth policy.  
These plans reflect a general consensus, at least in the abstract, that 
more growth near transit is a desired outcome.  San Diego’s General 
Plan City of Villages Strategy9 and Climate Action Plan (“CAP”)10 are 
the two most important documents.  Each calls for land use rules that 
facilitate more development, more homes, and more jobs near the 
region’s transit investments. 
The General Plan does not by itself add development capacity near 
transit.  The General Plan’s City of Villages Strategy relies on future 
updates to community plans to “designate land uses and assign 
densities, [requiring that] they must preserve or increase planned 
capacity of residential land uses to ensure compliance with the City’s 
                                                          
6. See Ethan N. Elkind, Michelle Chan, & Tuong-Vi Faber, Grading 
California’s Rail Transit Station Areas, CENTER FOR LAW, ENERGY, & THE ENV’T AT 
UC BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAW at 3, 14, 39 (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.next10.org 
/sites/default/files/grading-california-rail-transit-station-areas.pdf.  
7. Opening San Diego’s Door to Lower Housing Costs, FERMANIAN BUS. & 
ECON. INST. AT POINT LOMA NAZARENE UNIV. at 11 (Jan. 2015), http://nebula 
.wsimg.com/de788b5616c255287f0d8d294150d113?AccessKeyId=83DD3BA8B6D
5B0BFB690&disposition=0&alloworigin=1.  
8. Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, & Raven E. Saks, Why Have Housing 
Prices Gone Up?, HARVARD INST. OF ECON. RESEARCH at 5 (Feb. 2005), https://schol 
ar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/why_have_housing_prices_gone_up.pdf.  
9. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, GENERAL PLAN LAND USE AND COMMUNITY PLANNING 
ELEMENT 22 (2010), http://www.sandiego.gov/planning/genplan/pdf/generalplan/ 
landuse2010.pdf. 
10. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 37–39 (Dec. 5, 2015, amended 
July 12, 2016), https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/final_july_2016_cap 
.pdf. 
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regional share goal.”11  In short, the General Plan relies on future 
planning efforts to implement its goal. 
Similarly, the CAP does not directly add development capacity, or 
make development more feasible near transit.  Instead, the CAP sets 
goals for the number of people who live near transit stations who will 
use public transportation instead of private vehicles to commute.  The 
CAP also requires the city to later adopt policies and community plan 
updates that will achieve its mode share and climate goals.12 
Both the CAP and the General Plan look toward future updates to 
planning documents to achieve their goals.  They rely on one-off and 
case-by case decisions that affect neighborhood-level plans or 
individual entitlements.  They reflect a standard approach to land use 
planning decisions13 and do not make use of the potential advantages 
of more legislative and programmatic policy proposals. 
B.  In San Diego, Neighborhood-Level Plans are Difficult to Update 
The City of San Diego has a General Plan and roughly 50 
community plans that outline land use and zoning rules at a 
neighborhood level.14  Community plans are the documents where the 
rubber meets the road for many local land use goals.  They translate 
conceptual visions into on-the-ground land use rules for what can be 
built where. 
For proponents of smart growth, efforts to update San Diego 
community plans have been frustrating.  As an initial matter, updating 
community plans takes a long time.  They also require consistent and 
ongoing resources to bring them to fruition.  Budget crises and shifting 
                                                          
11. GENERAL PLAN LAND USE AND COMMUNITY PLANNING ELEMENT, supra 
note 9, at 22. 
12. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 10, at 37–39.  
13. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 86–92 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing common one-off land-use procedures as 
plans, maps, map amendments, and variances).  
14. Community Profiles, SANDIEGO.GOV, https://www.sandiego.gov/planning/ 
community/profiles (last visited May 1, 2019).  
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political priorities have limited the City of San Diego’s ability to update 
its community plans.15 
Further, even the plans that have been updated recently after years 
of delay—or those near completion—have often not resulted in smart 
growth outcomes.  Recent efforts to update the Barrio Logan 
community plan were overturned through a ballot initiative.16  Many 
members of community planning groups in the Uptown and North Park 
neighborhoods fiercely resist added density, despite those areas’ rich 
transit options.  Some proposals for updates to those plans only allow 
new capacity if tied with time-consuming and discretionary review 
processes.17 
Some bright spots for smart growth have occurred, like the 
residential capacity added to the Southeastern Community Plan.18  
There has been some suggestion that added capacity in neighborhood-
level plans tends to occur in areas without near-term market-interest for 
new development.19  Some finalized community plan updates, like in 
Uptown, produced mixed results with an overall capacity reduction, but 
that was paired with less restrictive height limits.20  More recent 
community plan updates have been more aggressive in moving the 
                                                          
15. Adrian Florido, Next on the Chopping Block: Community Plans?, VOICE OF 
SAN DIEGO (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/photo-book/next-on-
the-chopping-block-community-plans.  
16. Tom Fudge & Jill Replogle, San Diego Voters Reject Barrio Logan 
Community Plan, KPBS (June 4, 2014), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2014/jun/03 
/council-plan-barrio-logan-losing-early-returns.  
17. Andrew Keatts, North Park Presents a Big Test for City’s Climate Action 
Plan, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/ 
topics/land-use/north-park-presents-a-big-test-for-citys-climate-action-plan. 
18. David Garrick, Zoning changes aim to boost Southeastern San Diego, SAN 
DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Dec. 6, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune 
.com/news/2015/dec/06/encanto-southeast-san-diego-zoning-development.  
19. Andrew Keatts, Council Members Want Zombie Redevelopment Dollars to 
Lure Actual Development Dollars, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Apr. 13, 2016), 
http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/land-use/council-members-want-zombie-red 
evelopment-dollars-to-lure-actual-development-dollars.  
20. Andrew Bowen, San Diego City Council OKs Uptown Growth Plans, KPBS 
(Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.kpbs.org/news/2016/nov/15/san-diego-city-council-
oks-uptown-growth-plans; CITY OF SAN DIEGO, UPTOWN COMMUNITY PLAN UPDATE 
PRESENTATION (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/2016_ 
feb_2_uptown_planners_lu_presentation.pdf.  
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needle in the direction toward sustainable growth, however sometimes 
still modestly.21 
C.  Innovations to Update Only Subsets of Community Plans in San 
Diego are No Silver Bullet 
In 2013, the City of San Diego responded to the difficulty of 
updating community plans by proposing to update only portions of 
individual community plans.  Instead of attempting to reach community 
consensus over a large and complex plan, the strategy was to update 
only the parts of community plans where development was likely to 
occur, such as near transit.22  The hope behind this approach was that a 
smaller piece of geography would be administratively simpler, and 
keeping the plan changes to commercial and multi-family areas was 
likely to generate less opposition from incumbent single-family home 
owners. 
Unfortunately for smart growth proponents, the attempt to update 
planning documents around only transit stations was not any easier.  In 
the Clairemont neighborhood, that strategy was used to propose 
updated land uses near the stations of the planned Mid-Coast Trolley 
Extension.  The planning effort resulted in one of the most unruly land 
use debates in recent memory.23  As a result, the City of San Diego has 
                                                          
21. Andrew Bowen, San Diego City Council Approves Update To North Park 
Growth Plans, KPBS (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.kpbs.org/news/2016/oct/ 
25/north-park-community-plan-update-san-diego-council; David Garrick, Planning 
Commission approves dense housing near Morena Boulevard trolley stations, SAN 
DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Feb. 21, 2019, 2:45 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune 
.com/news/politics/sd-me-morena-building-height-20190221-story.html.  
22. Andrew Keatts, The Plan to Fix Lengthy Plan Updates, VOICE OF SAN 
DIEGO (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/all-narratives/growth-hou 
sing/the-plan-to-fix-lengthy-plan-updates/.  
23. Andrew Keatts, An Unruly Clairemont Crowd Asks: ‘Leave Us in Peace’, 
VOICE OF SAN DIEGO, (May 1, 2014), http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/all-narrat 
ives/height-limit/an-unruly-clairemont-crowd-asks-leave-us-in-peace.  
7
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struggled, going back and forth from only marginal increases to land 
use capacity24 to a more robust proposal years later.25 
It should be noted that efforts to update subsets of community plans 
have resulted in some positive smart growth outcomes.  The Grantville 
Focused Plan Amendment26 is an example of a successful use of this 
strategy—it created higher development capacities than the initial 
efforts around the planned Mid-Coast Trolley Extension.  However, 
San Diego’s experience has shown that there is no silver bullet from 
updating only parts of community plans.  The point is not that 
community plan updates, or updates to subset of plans, cannot ever 
achieve smart growth goals; instead, San Diego’s experience shows that 
those changes to land use are long and difficult, even when smaller in 
geographic scale. 
D.  Capacity Limits in San Diego’s Community Plans are not the Only 
Barriers to Smart Growth 
Much of the conversation around the need to improve land use 
outcomes in the City of San Diego focuses on adding development 
capacity to community plans.  While targeted increases to capacity may 
very well be necessary, it is not the only strategy available to increase 
the supply of homes, and to build more near transit. 
The City of San Diego already zones a sufficient number of parcels 
for multi-family development to accommodate all of its projected 
                                                          
24. Compare Memorandum from William Fulton, Director, City of San Diego 
Neighborhoods & Econ. Dev. Dep’t., to Lorie Zapf, Councilmember, District 6 (Apr. 
23, 2014), http://voiceofsandiego.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/FultonMemo.pdf 
with Memorandum from Mike Hansen, Director, City of San Diego Planning Dep’t., 
to Lorie Zapf, Councilmember, District 6 (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.voiceof 
sandiego.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Hansen-memo-to-CM-Zapf-re-Revisions-
to-the-Morena-Corridor-Specific-Plan.pdf.  See also Andrew Keatts, City on Raising 
Clairemont Height Limit: Nevermind, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Apr. 24, 2016), 
http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/2014/04/24/city-on-raising-clairemont-height-limit-
nevermind/.  
25. Andrew Keats, The Mid-Coast Trolley’s On-Again-Off-Again Height Limit 
Increase Is On Again, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.voice 
ofsandiego.org/topics/land-use/the-mid-coast-trolleys-on-again-off-again-height-lim 
it-increase-is-on-again.  
26. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, MINUTES FOR REGULAR COUNCIL MEETING, ITEM 332: 
GRANTVILLE FOCUSED PLAN AMENDMENT (June 9, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://sandiego 
.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=3&clip_id=6442.  
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housing needs.27  All jurisdictions in California are required to meet this 
zoning threshold through Housing Element Law.28  While some cities 
resist these requirements,29 San Diego has a history of dutiful 
compliance. 
Although the City of San Diego does set aside sufficient land for 
homes, San Diego fails to produce as many homes as their housing 
element allows.30  The figures are especially dire for homes that are 
affordable to low income families.31  San Diego is not alone in this; 
other cities across California have similarly low production figures 
compared to need, despite sufficient, planned residential capacity.32  A 
growing body of research shows that zoning capacity alone is not 
sufficient to meet housing needs.  Several studies have shown that 
California Housing Element Law is insufficient to meet its goals.33  
Further, recent studies of upzoning in Chicago also show unsatisfactory 
results in the short term.34 
                                                          
27. See SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, REGIONAL HOUSING NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
PLAN (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.sandag.org/uploads/publicationid/publicationid_ 
1661_14392.pdf. 
28. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65100 (West 2019).  
29. Jesse Marx, Judge Puts Encinitas Voters’ Veto Power Over Housing Plans 
on Ice, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org 
/topics/land-use/judge-puts-encinitas-voters-veto-power-over-housing-plans-on-ice.  
30. REGIONAL HOUSING NEEDS ASSESSMENT PLAN, supra note 27, at 23. 
31. Id. 
32. CAL. DEP’T OF HOUS. & COMTY. DEV., SB 35 STATEWIDE DETERMINATION 
SUMMARY (Dec. 2018), http://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-
element/docs/SB35_StatewideDeterminationSummary.pdf (demonstrating that most 
jurisdictions in California have failed to produce sufficient homes, qualifying them 
for housing streamlining benefits from Senate Bill 35). 
33. MAC TAYLOR, DO COMMUNITIES ADEQUATELY PLAN FOR HOUSING?, CAL. 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (Mar. 8, 2017), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/ 
3605/plan-for-housing-030817.pdf; see Paul G. Lewis, California’s Housing Element 
Law: The Issue of Local Noncompliance, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA 
(2003), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_203PLR.pdf; Liam Dillon, 
California lawmakers have tried for 50 years to fix the state’s housing crisis. Here’s 
why they’ve failed, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com 
/projects/la-pol-ca-housing-supply. 
34. See Yonah Freemark, Upzoning Chicago: Impacts of a Zoning Reform on 
Property Values and Housing Construction, URB. AFF. REV. (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1078087418824672.  
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Since there is no equivalent state law to housing elements for 
commercial development capacity, quantifying the adequacy of 
development capacity for non-residential projects is not straight 
forward.  However, the City of San Diego does employ a significant set 
of policies in its General Plan to preserve lands for industrial and 
economic development.35 
There are two primary reasons why new developments do not occur 
on the level that San Diego’s zoning capacity allows.  First, zoning 
capacity may not be located in areas where market demand is sufficient 
to actually build.  If everyone in San Diego wants to live on the coast, 
but San Diego satisfies its housing element requirements by primarily 
adding capacity away from the coast, in areas without strong market 
demand, then less housing will be constructed than the Housing 
Element would permit.  Similarly, the land reserved for commercial and 
industrial development may not be located where there is a market for 
firms to locate or expand. 
Second, policies and development requirements may make new 
projects financially unfeasible at the accommodated density levels.  
These barriers often have nothing to do with density limitations.  Non-
density policies that inhibit sustainable growth can be embedded in 
community plans, such as height limits, setback requirements, fees on 
new developments, and public review requirements that add delays and 
costs to new projects.  If these requirements make building up to zoning 
capacity impractical from a financial perspective, developers will not 
build—or not build to full capacity.  In theory, community plan updates 
can fix some of the non-density barriers to sustainable growth that are 
included in those plans, so developments can actually achieve the 
densities the decisionmakers have decided to accept. 
Many policies that inhibit growth are not in community plans, but 
are instead embedded in the municipal code or other city-wide policies.  
In the City of San Diego off-street parking requirements,36 the methods 
for fee calculations37 and the process for measuring and mitigating 
                                                          
35. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, GENERAL PLAN, ECONOMIC PROSPERITY ELEMENT 
(2008), https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/planning/genplan/pdf/ge 
neralplan/adoptedepelem.pdf.  
36. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 14, §§ 142.0501–142.0560 (2019). 
37. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 14, §§ 142.0601–142.0680 (2019). 
10
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traffic impacts38 are all policies that restrict new development, but 
which are largely located in city-wide codes and not in neighborhood-
level community plans.  These barriers to development are often not 
tied to any limitations on density or zoning capacity.  Amending 
community planning documents, or adding allowed development 
capacity, will do nothing to address barriers created by these city-wide 
policies.  Similarly, recent proposals to create additional zoning 
capacity through mechanisms like zoning budgets39 do not address 
these non-capacity restraints on development. 
Programmatic and city-wide policy changes should be a part of any 
effort to improve smart growth outcomes.  These changes are necessary 
to address the non-density barriers to smart growth.  Further, 
programmatic policy changes can also be easier to adopt, politically. 
II.  STRUCTURE OF POLICY QUESTIONS IMPACT THE EASE OF SMART 
GROWTH POLICY ADOPTION 
A.  Smart Growth Policy is More Difficult to Adopt when it has a 
Narrower Geographic Impact 
Community plan updates for smart growth outcomes are difficult 
to achieve.  Despite being smaller and having a limited impact, updating 
subsets of community plans can be even more difficult.  The smaller the 
scope of a smart growth policy, the more effective the opposition seems. 
While this dynamic may seem counterintuitive, it is not unfamiliar 
to anyone involved with the politics of real estate development.  When 
a project seeks entitlements through conditional use permits, variances, 
or zoning amendments, it often seeks policy changes on the most 
geographically narrow of questions: the development of an individual 
project.  Opposition to individual projects is often the subject of the 
most rancorous and effective public opposition. 
                                                          
38. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, TRAFFIC IMPACT STUDY MANUAL (July 1998), 
https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/development-services/pdf/indust 
ry/trafficimpact.pdf; CITY OF SAN DIEGO, LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE TRIP 
GENERATION MANUAL (May 2003), https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/ 
legacy//planning/documents/pdf/trans/tripmanual.pdf.  
39. See Roderick J. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning 
Budget,” 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81 (2011). 
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Policy changes with a relatively narrow geographic scope directly 
impact a small set of people.  Nonetheless, opposition to sustainable 
growth policy seems to be effective and fervent when those policies 
impact the fewest number of people, or the smallest amount of 
geography.  This begs the question of “Why?” 
Political science has the answer.  In 1963, Mancur Olson wrote that 
when public policy can provide concentrated benefits to smaller and 
more easily organized groups, those groups are often able to prevail 
over larger groups even when costs are spread across society.40 
Land use politics fits Olson’s observation.  Broader society is likely 
to experience diffuse public benefits from smart growth policies 
because of reduced congestion, lower greenhouse gasses, economic 
growth, and more affordable homes.  However, the benefit to the city 
as a whole from one neighborhood-level plan, or one new housing 
development may be relatively small and diffuse.  As such, larger city-
wide interests like housing advocates, business groups, and smart 
growth environmentalists may not see the value in spending time and 
resources to support individual projects or community plan updates.  
The narrowness of small-scale decisions creates collective action 
problems for large groups interested in promoting wider benefits.  
Large groups will have greater difficulty policing free-riders, who let 
others do the hard work of organizing for new smart growth 
development, but hope to partake in development’s benefits. 
For small-scale decisions, individual residents or neighborhood 
groups who oppose smart growth are better situated to advocate for their 
own interests.  Anti-development forces express their preference for 
policy outcomes such as maintaining the status quo, limiting access to 
neighborhood amenities, and enhancing their own property values by 
excluding new developments nearby.41  They may feel that those 
outcomes provide them with concentrated benefits, or at least ward off 
an experience of concentrated harms.  Like many political actors, anti-
development advocates can seek policy outcomes that they feel will 
benefit them, even if that would externalize costs onto society more 
generally. 
                                                          
40. See OLSON, supra note 3; see also Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 
4, at 1707–08 (discussing Olson in depth). 
41. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME 
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, & LAND-
USE POLITICS (2001). 
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Unlike larger, reginal groups who may support more smart growth 
development, smaller groups who oppose development are easier to 
organize.  There are lower costs to organizing smaller groups, whose 
members often live near one another and have more immediate and 
shared concerns.  Smaller groups can also utilize social pressures to 
keep their neighbors from free-riding.  In addition, smaller groups may 
also feel that the public policy benefit at stake is of a unique impact to 
them directly.  The narrowness of who might benefit from a small-scale 
public policy helps individuals and smaller groups feel justified in 
spending the time and effort to advocate for their views. 
While the entire city might benefit from smart growth, San Diego’s 
choice to have many small-scale community plans gives smart growth 
opponents a structural advantage over land use policy.  Dividing 
development decisions into neighborhood level community plans, 
which are smaller and less diverse than the city as a whole, provides 
smaller anti-growth groups with more leverage.  Development 
opponents have both the incentive and ability to organize for policy 
outcomes they believe will benefit their neighborhood, even if their 
policy preferences would result in diffuse costs to the broader public. 
The City of San Diego compounded the advantage to anti-
development groups by forming community planning groups to advise 
on small-scale neighborhood and project-level decisions.  While these 
groups provide important local perspective, they often adopt 
recommendations against smart growth.  Recent publications have 
demonstrated that the rules governing the City of San Diego’s 
community planning groups allow for the exclusion of many 
community members, which conflicts with generally accepted 
commitments to democratic participation in local government.42  The 
City of San Diego actually pre-organizes the opposition.43  These kinds 
                                                          
42. Colin Parent, Maya Rosas, & Oscar Medina, Democracy in Planning, 
CIRCULATE SAN DIEGO (2018), http://www.circulatesd.org/democracyinplanning; 
OFFICE OF THE SAN DIEGO CITY AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF COMMUNITY 
PLANNING GROUPS (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/ default/files/19-
013_community_planning_groups.pdf; SAN DIEGO GRAND JURY, SAN DIEGO 
COMMUNITY PLANNING GROUPS (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.sandiegocounty. 
gov/content/dam/sdc/grandjury/reports/2017-2018/SanDiegoCommunityPlanningGr 
oups.pdf.  
43. Other academic work has shown that neighborhood councils like San 
Diego’s community planning groups can be institutional organs to oppose new 
development.  Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 4, at 1712.  The City of Seattle 
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of structures can impact who does and who does not participate in land 
use decision-making.44 
Of course, the community planning process also provides 
substantial benefits by providing expertise and public participation by 
residents, many of whom nobly seek broad public benefits from 
neighborhood level plans.  Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that 
the community planning process in San Diego structurally disfavors 
considerations of broader public goals in land use decision-making. 
B.  Smart Growth Policies are Easier to Adopt when they are 
Programmatic or City-Wide 
Olson’s theory predicts that if smaller anti-development groups are 
unable to achieve concentrated benefits from policy, their incentives to 
oppose smart growth policies diminish and their efforts will be less 
effective.  This suggests that policymaking on a larger geographic scale 
will more likely result in better outcomes for smart growth.  Several 
empirical studies have supported this idea, where dispositive land use 
decisions are made at higher levels of government.  Specifically, a 
recent study showed that where land use decisions are made at a higher 
level of government, housing tends to be less income segregated.45  
That same study showed jurisdictions that require more public decision-
making steps for project entitlement—which are often neighborhood-
level processes—tend to experience more income segregation.  The 
California Legislative Analyst’s Office also credits the strong roles 
some states play in local planning decisions as the cause for higher 
housing construction and better affordability outcomes.46 
                                                          
recently ended public support for their various neighborhood groups, replacing them 
with several city-wide mechanisms to collect public input.  Erica C. Barnett, How 
Seattle Is Dismantling a NIMBY Power Structure, NEXTCITY (Apr. 3, 2017), 
https://nextcity.org/features/view/seattle-nimbys-neighborhood-planning-decisions.  
44. Katherine Levine, Maxwell Palmer, & David M. Glick, Who Participates in 
Local Government? Evidence from Meeting Minutes, PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 
(June 29, 2018), http://sites.bu.edu/kleinstein/research.  
45. See MICHAEL C. LENS & PAAVAO MONKKONEN, DO STRICT LAND USE 
REGULATIONS MAKE METROPOLITAN AREAS MORE SEGREGATED BY INCOME? 
(2015), http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/Documents/areas/ctr/ziman/2015-04WP.pdf. 
46. MAC TAYLOR, CALIFORNIA’S HIGH HOUSING COSTS: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES, CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (Mar. 17, 2015), 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/finance/housing-costs/housing-costs.aspx.  
14
California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol55/iss2/3
Colin Parent camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 7/10/2019  9:20 AM 
2019]    CITY-WIDE: A STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 377 
For local governments, this insight means they will find more 
favorable political environments if they pursue policy on a larger 
geographic scale as opposed to a smaller one.  Decisionmakers in local 
government do not have the option to allocate more decision-making to 
higher levels of government such as the state legislature.  However, 
cities do have the authority to focus their efforts on programmatic and 
city-wide policy changes, and to avoid making neighborhood or 
project-level choices. 
Because of their scale of impact, city-wide policy efforts have the 
potential to create more diffuse benefits that span across multiple 
neighborhoods.  These policies do not generate the same potential to 
create concentrated neighborhood-level benefits, removing the 
incentive for local opponents to organize for their own ends at the 
expense of the broader public. 
The potential for widespread benefits also incentivizes city-wide 
and regional political actors to engage in these efforts.  A policy that 
will broadly increase the supply of housing in a region can engage 
housing advocates,47 climate activists, and business groups in a way 
that any individual development may not.  City-wide groups can see the 
benefit of weighing in on city-wide policies because the scale of their 
impact can be sufficiently large.  In effect, city-wide and legislative 
decision-making addresses the collective action problem of local land 
use decisions by aggregating decisions.48  Instead of fighting hundreds 
or thousands of project-level decisions, pro-housing and pro-
development groups can focus their efforts on a handful of key city-
wide policies. 
Programmatic and city-wide policies also can engage new and 
powerful political supporters, who can be enlisted to overcome anti-
development opposition.  New developments generally create a new 
economic surplus that developers and their investors are attempting to 
capture.  A common dynamic in development fights includes 
developers agreeing to carve out a portion of that economic surplus to 
transfer to project opponents to secure their support or neutrality.  This 
can mean developers agree to build a new park or change design 
                                                          
47. Developers can also act as an imperfect stand-in for the interests of people 
who want access to new homes, who have insufficient incentives to lobby for 
themselves.  Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 4, at 1709. 
48. There are also other methods to aggregate smaller decisions in decision-
making, including through binding precedent and class actions.  Id. at 1715 n.172. 
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elements of a building.  Sometimes what opponents seek is not a share 
of the new larger economic pie, but rather a smaller building or a 
building to house fewer people.  This can actually reduce the new 
economic value and also reduce the number of homes or workplaces 
created.  This means that the exchange of value between the developer 
and the opponents may also create diffuse harms to a community that 
needs more homes or economic development. 
Some have argued that a strategy to address neighborhood 
opposition should be to establish policies that institutionalize the 
transfer of new value generated from development to the opposition.  
One proposal is “Tax Increment Local Transfers,” which would 
dedicate a share of future tax increment caused by a new development 
to the residents where that development is located.49  Developments in 
California already create a similar type of transfer in the form of 
unusually large development impact fees.50  Those fees are a major 
source of funding to neighborhood-level improvements like street 
facilities, parks, and more.  However, the potential for neighborhoods 
to benefit financially from new developments does not seem to have 
caused many opposition groups to become supporters of new housing, 
and instead the added costs to development is likely deterring housing 
construction.51 
An alternative strategy facilitated by larger-scale programmatic 
policies is to grow the economic increment of future new developments 
and allocate some of that added value to new stakeholders who can be 
enlisted to support the policy change.  Density bonuses are a good 
example of such a policy strategy.  Density bonus programs provide 
more development capacity to a developer, increasing the value 
increment.  Use of a density bonus program is contingent on a developer 
allocating some of the new value to deed-restricted affordable units.  
                                                          
49. Id. at 1726–32. 
50. Clancy Mullen, National Impact Fee Survey: 2015, DUNCAN ASSOCIATES 
(Nov. 11, 2015), http://impactfees.com/publications%20pdf/ 2015_survey.pdf; Adam 
Deermount, Why are California impact fees so high?, BUILDER (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.builderonline.com/building/regulation-policy/why-california-impact-
fees-are-so-high_o.  
51. Sarah Mawhorter, David Garcia, & Hayley Raetz, It All Adds Up: The Cost 
of Housing Development Fees in Seven California Cities, TERNER CTR. FOR HOUS. 
INNOVATION (Mar. 2018), http://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/Development_ 
Fees_Report_Final_2.pdf.  
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Advocates for low income housing are likely to lend political support 
to a proposal to create such a policy, even though they may be agnostic 
or disengaged in a policy that merely upzoned without an affordable 
requirement. 
This is a concept that is distinct from past views of how developers 
can navigate a city’s anti-development politics.  Instead of individual 
developers needing to overcome opposition on their individual projects, 
they can find a common cause with other developers as well as 
advocates for other issues like housing supply, climate change, and 
affordability.  To create an effective political economy around a policy 
decision, policymakers can design smart growth proposals to create 
opportunities for alliance-making between interest groups that have not 
always seen value in collaboration.  Such coalitions can provide 
political cover for elected decisionmakers, especially against the 
preferences for status quo that so often dominate conversations about 
land use policy. 
Fortunately, city-wide policies that promote smart development—
especially near transit—have the potential to attract wide and diverse 
support.  The business community is interested in smart growth in part 
because any development is economic activity, which tends to benefit 
the economy as a whole.52  Smart growth also increases the accessible 
labor pool to local employers.53 Advocates for affordable homes 
support more housing overall;54 they support smart growth because it 
will allow low income residents to live near transit, so they can move 
around more affordably and conveniently.55  Many environmentalists 
                                                          
52. Dena Belzer, Sujata Srivastava, & Mason Austin, Transit and Regional 
Economic Development, CTR. FOR TRANSIT-ORIENTED DEV. (May 2011), 
http://www.reconnectingamerica.org/assets/Uploads/TransitandRegionalED2011.pd
f.  
53. Christopher B. Leinberger & Michael Rodriguez, Foot Traffic Ahead: 
Ranking Walkable Urbanism in America’s Largest Metros, GEO. WASH. SCH. OF BUS. 
27 (2016), http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/foot-traffic-ahead-201 
6.pdf  
54. CALIFORNIA’S HIGH HOUSING COSTS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra 
note 46.  
55. Zak Accuardi, Inclusive Transit: Advancing Equity Through Improved 
Access and Opportunity, TRANSITCENTER (July 17, 2018), http://transitcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Inclusive-1.pdf; see CTR. FOR TRANSIT-ORIENTED DEV. 
AND CTR. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD TECH., THE AFFORDABILITY INDEX: A NEW TOOL FOR 
MEASURING THE TRUE AFFORDABILITY OF A HOUSING CHOICE, BROOKINGS 
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support transit oriented development and other sustainable growth 
policies that allow more people to commute without a car, which is 
critical to lowering greenhouse gas emissions.56 
This is not to say that every decision should be made on a city-wide 
basis.  The nature of real estate is uniqueness, and certain projects or 
parcels will surely require individual decision-making from time to 
time.  Changing land use designations from industrial to residential 
generally must occur through zoning changes on an individual parcel of 
the neighborhood-level plan.  Also, certain other decisions should be 
made at the neighborhood level, as such discourse positively impacts 
many types of land use policy.  Further, issues of design, character, and 
history may all be appropriate for decision-making at a project, or 
neighborhood level. 
Cities have options for how to adopt policy.  If a city desires more 
smart growth outcomes, it could choose to set up a series of votes to 
separately change policies in a variety of separate neighborhoods.  Each 
vote would attract its own set of opponents and supporters.  Smaller 
anti-development groups from each neighborhood would have 
incentives to stop the policy changes that impact them most directly.  
Alternatively, a city could set up one or two votes that change policy 
across multiple neighborhoods at the same time, allowing more smart 
growth development.  Such a programmatic policy could have as much 
impact as a series of neighborhood-level policy changes, but with a 
more favorable political dynamic that removes the incentive for anti-
development groups to seek concentrated benefits for themselves at the 
cost of the broader public. 
Every city and elected official has limited time and political capital.  
Political energies and staff time dedicated to achieving smart growth 
outcomes should be focused on policy decisions where the political 
economy is most likely to result in supportive decisions.  This is similar 
to the concept of forum shopping, a concept from legal advocacy that 
                                                          
INSTITUTE (Jan. 2006), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2 
0060127_affindex.pdf.  
56. Why Creating and Preserving Affordable Homes Near Transit is a Highly 
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can be usefully applied to land use policymaking.57  If smart growth 
goals are more likely to be supported when they are presented as city-
wide legislative proposals, then that is a preferable forum than 
individualized and neighborhood-level decisions. 
Similarly, political scientists have found that how policy questions 
are presented can have an impact on the outcome.  The concept of 
“heresthetics” from William H. Riker suggests that political actors can 
structure political decision-making in a manner that can help them 
achieve their policy goals, even if the policy preferences of 
decisionmakers remain static.58  Therefore, if local decisionmakers are 
more likely to oppose smart growth decisions that are on a smaller 
geographic area, then politicians, policy staff, and planners should 
propose policy solutions to apply to larger geographic areas. 
III.  REAL WORLD EXAMPLES SHOW PROGRAMMATIC AND CITY-WIDE 
POLICIES CAN ACHIEVE SMART GROWTH OUTCOMES 
A.  San Diego Enjoys Success Adopting Smart Growth Policy City-
Wide 
The City of San Diego is traditionally a car-oriented sunbelt city, 
with demonstrable difficulties achieving smart growth outcomes.  
However, San Diego has enjoyed recent examples of how 
programmatic and city-wide policies can be politically viable to achieve 
smart growth goals. 
In 2012, San Diego adopted a progressive set of rules that require 
less parking for deed-restricted affordable homes, especially for those 
projects developed near transit.59  The reform came after a 2011 study 
which found excessive parking had been constructed in deed-restricted 
affordable buildings.60  This policy was careful not to define parking 
rules on the basis of a map, but instead defined them based on 
                                                          
57. Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at 
Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV.79, 105 (1999). 
58. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION (Yale Univ. 
Press 1986).  
59. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 14, §§ 142.0501–142.0560 (2019).  
60. Wilbur Smith Associates, San Diego Affordable Housing Parking Study 
(Dec. 2011), https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/planning/programs 
/transportation/mobility/pdf/111231sdafhfinal.pdf.  
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programmatic elements like a project’s walkability to transit.  This 
policy change was adopted city-wide and with relatively little 
opposition.  One might imagine a different result for this set of new 
parking rules if they were proposed for a single neighborhood, and 
incumbent residents felt singled out and organized to stop reform.  
Parking policy in the City of San Diego is traditionally a city-wide 
programmatic policy, as the parking rules are generally located in the 
city-wide municipal code.61 
The recent enhancements to the City of San Diego’s density bonus 
program are instructive.  San Diego’s enhanced bonus policy allows 
developers to build even more units than state density bonus62 in 
exchange for higher dedication of deed-restricted affordable homes.63  
This is a programmatic policy that allows developments to build above 
and beyond what underlying zoning would allow. 
This program update attracted a wide variety of supporters, 
including organizations that promote affordable housing, market-rate 
developers, climate advocates, business organizations, and professional 
REALTORS.64  These groups often align on different sides of the 
political spectrum.  However, they have a common desire to add more 
housing supply, more development near transit, and to streamline the 
process for the right kinds of developments.  The author of this article 
began the effort to develop the enhancements to the density bonus 
program, with the intent to both utilize and demonstrate the ideas that 
are discussed in this piece.  The program was adopted unanimously with 
                                                          
61. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 14, §§ 142.0501–142.0560 (1997), 
http://docs.sandiego.gov/municode/MuniCodeChapter14/Ch14Art02 Division05.pdf.  
While parking rules in the City of San Diego have generally been located in the city-
wide municipal code, certain sets of rules applied to certain programmatic areas like 
beaches or near universities.  The rules reflected inconsistent priorities, developed 
over time in a haphazard fashion.  See Colin Parent, Parking, CIRCULATE SAN DIEGO 
(May 5, 2016), http://www.circulatesd.org/parking.  
62. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65915–65918 (1979);  
63. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 14, §§143.0710–143.0750 (1997), 
http://docs.sandiego.gov/municode/MuniCodeChapter14/Ch14Art03 Division07.pdf. 
64. Colin Parent, Policy Letter: Coalition of Supporters for Affordable Homes 
Bonus Program, CIRCULATE SAN DIEGO (June 16, 2016), http://www.circulatesd 
.org/affordablehomesbonus (demonstrating a group of ideologically diverse 
organizations supporting an enhancement to the City of San Diego’s density bonus 
program).  
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almost no public opposition.65  Initial data shows that the program is 
driving new construction of both market-rate and affordable homes.66 
In 2017, San Diego’s current Mayor Kevin Faulconer released his 
“Housing-SD” strategy which includes a large number of city-wide and 
programmatic policy proposals, along with continued efforts to update 
community plans.67  One of the first programmatic policies adopted 
furthered enhancements to the City of San Diego’s density bonus 
program, replicating the earlier success with a similar set of coalition 
partners.68 
More recently, the City of San Diego adopted more dramatic 
parking reform, eliminating parking minimums for developments 
within a half mile of high performing transit.69  While the vote was not 
unanimous,70 it was adopted by a supermajority of councilmembers and 
with support of a broad coalition of supporters.  The policy is 
programmatic for any development that meets certain characteristics. 
                                                          
65. Council Hearing Minutes, CITY OF SAN DIEGO (June 21, 2016), 
http://dockets.sandiego.gov/sirepub/pubmtgframe.aspx?meetid=3091&doctype=Min
utes.  
66. Colin Parent, Early Win for Affordable Homes Bonus Program, CIRCULATE 
SAN DIEGO (Oct. 18, 2018), http://www.circulatesd.org/ahbpreport; Josh Cohen, San 
Diego’s Affordable Housing Program Could One Up California, NEXTCITY (Oct. 26, 
2017), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/san-diego-affordable-housing-inclusionary-zo 
ning-success.  
67. Fact Sheet: Mayor Kevin L. Faulconer’s ‘Housing SD’ Plan, CITY OF SAN 
DIEGO (June 21, 2017), https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/20170621_ 
housingsdfactsheetfinal.pdf.  Mayor Faulconer’s Housing-SD plan also incorporates 
many of the city-wide policy proposals recommended by the author in a 2017 report.  
Colin Parent, Transit Oriented Development, CIRCULATE SAN DIEGO (Jan. 9, 2017), 
http://www.circulatesd.org/todreport.  
68. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 14, §§143.0710–143.0750 (2018); 
David Garrick, New San Diego incentives aim to boost moderate-income housing, 
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Mar. 6, 2018, 8:00 PM), https://www.sandiegounion 
tribune.com/news/politics/sd-me-density-bonus-20180306-story.html.  
69. Andrew Bowen, City Council OKs Sweeping Urban Parking Reforms, 
KPBS (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.kpbs.org/news/2019/mar/04/city-council-urban-
parking-minimum-housing/.  
70. Dave Schwab, Councilmember Bry will not support removing parking 
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While San Diego appears poised to continue updating 
neighborhood-level community plans, some more effective, quick 
improvements have been made through legislative and city-wide 
efforts.  Programmatic changes that apply across multiple 
neighborhoods have been successful in attracting diverse support from 
powerful interest groups.  The result has been a noticeable shift in local 
land use politics, driving both policy outcomes and national attention.71 
B.  Other Governments have Recently Succeeded in Adopting City-
Wide and Programmatic Land Use Reforms 
In Los Angeles, Measure JJJ provides an example of another 
California city implementing land use reforms through programmatic 
policy.72  The policy includes major density bonuses, but only when 
projects include both affordable homes and labor standards.  Portions 
of the new economic value would be used to enlist support from 
organizations which would otherwise not have had a direct stake in the 
policy decision, instead of to buy off organizations with a preexisting 
distaste for new development.  Like with other density bonuses, the 
policy is programmatic, leaving individual neighborhood-level plans 
alone while still allowing developments to depart from local rules.  Of 
note, the density bonus of Measure JJJ is a hybrid, with the initial 
measure adopted by a plebiscite, and the density bonus policy 
promulgated by the City Planning Director. 
San Francisco reformed its parking rules in 2018, eliminating 
minimums city-wide.73  Further, in 2017, San Francisco also adopted 
Home-SF,74 a form of density bonus.  The program was designed to 
implement state density bonus law, and to allow even greater benefits 
                                                          
71. Liam Dillon, After decades of suburban sprawl, San Diego eyes big shift to 
dense development, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-
pol-ca-big-cities-housing-plans-san-diego-20190225-story.html.  
72. VINCENT P. BERTONI, TECHNICAL CLARIFICATIONS TO THE TRANSIT 
ORIENTED COMMUNITIES AFFORDABLE HOUSING INCENTIVE PROGRAM GUIDELINES 
(TOC GUIDELINES), CITY OF L.A., (revised Feb. 26, 2018), https://planning.lacity 
.org/ordinances/docs/toc/TOCGuidelines.pdf. 
73. CITY & CTY. OF S.F., MEETING MINUTES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://sfbos.org 
/sites/default/files/bag121118_minutes.pdf.  
74. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE art. 2, § 206.3 (2019).  A variety of 
background information and FAQ documents are available on the San Francisco 
Planning Department web page at https://sfplanning.org/project/home-sf.  
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for projects with higher levels of affordable homes.  While the process 
for adopting Home-SF was far from smooth, it represents a significant 
effort toward smart growth policy in a city that has recently been a 
hotbed of anti-development advocacy.75 
Perhaps the most dramatic programmatic changes to land use 
policy have been through recent legislation in California.  Legislation 
has increasingly been used to override neighborhood-level plans and 
other policies that restrict smart growth.  Laws have been passed to cap 
the amount of parking required for homes near transit76 and allow for 
more accessory units to be built on single family lots.77  State law also 
recently reformed more esoteric components of local land use rules, like 
prohibiting localities from using level of service traffic measures as a 
part of environmental analyses.78 
Small anti-development groups have limited incentive to engage in 
city-wide policy reforms, but even less incentive to engage on state-
wide issues.  The reverse is also true.  State-wide interests like housing 
advocacy organizations, the building industry, and environmental 
groups all have a strong presence in state capitals.  They have the 
potential and incentives to make positive, large scale, public policy 
changes.  While local smart growth policymakers focus their efforts on 
city-wide policies, state lawmakers are well-suited to reform policies at 
a state-wide level. 
CONCLUSION 
As San Diego continues its efforts to implement its Climate Action 
Plan and City of Villages Strategy, it should focus more energy on city-
wide policies.  While community planning documents also need to be 
updated, city-wide policy reforms are both necessary, and potentially 
easier to adopt. 
Further, other cities can use the approach for legislative and 
programmatic policy to achieve smart growth results.  City-wide 
                                                          
75. Kristy Wang, HOME-SF: New Law Aims to Spark More Affordable 
Housing, SPUR (June 21, 2017), https://www.spur.org/news/2017-06-21/home-sf-
new-law-aims-spark-more-affordable-housing.  
76. Assemb. B. 744, 2015 Leg. Reg. Sess.  (Cal. 2015). 
77. S.B. 1069, 2016 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); Assemb. B. 2299, 2016 Leg. 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).  
78. Assemb. B. 743, 2013 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).  
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policies can be designed to attract political support from diverse and 
powerful constituencies.  A city-wide approach does not single out 
individual neighborhoods for changes, which tend to organize 
opposition that favors the status quo.  Approaching policy on a city-




California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol55/iss2/3
